Comparative Civilizations Review
Volume 30
Number 30 Spring 1994

Article 9

4-1-1994

Civilizations Are World Systems!
David Wilkinson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr

Recommended Citation
Wilkinson, David (1994) "Civilizations Are World Systems!," Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 30 : No.
30 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol30/iss30/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Comparative Civilizations Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For
more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Wilkinson: Civilizations Are World Systems!
59

CIVILIZATIONS ARE WORLD
SYSTEMS!
David Wilkinson
The title of this article states my position in the rieh and burgeoning
civilizationist/world-systems debate about as succinctly as possible.
Civilizationists and world-systems analysts should be studying the same
entities. This will occur if and when civilizationists accept that the many
local civilizations of the past have become the single global civilization of
today; and whcn world-systemists accept that the single, global world-system
of today is thc fusion product of a substantial number of smaller-scale world
systems of thc past; and when both accept that the plural civilizations of the
past, and the plural urbanized world systcms of the past, were, and that
today's singular civilization and singular world system are, identical.
A joint intellectual undertaking could then be pursued, probably with
different but complementary emphases. CiviliLationists might cluster their
efforts more (but not exclusively) toward the earlier, more pluralistic epochs
of civil izationa I evolution, world-systemists toward the later, more monistic.
Civilizationists already tend, I think, to interest themselves more in the
cultural aspects of a society than in the political. and more in the political
than in the ec()nomic; world-systemists tend oppositely; neither group need
surrender its inclinations, though each would have to take account of the
other's propo~itions.
Few readers will he shocked to learn that my proposals suit my own
established predilections; tor their benefit I should place my cards face up
on the table. In 1966 I was urging my graduate students in international
relations to find ways of integrating the work of Spengler and Toynbee with
what was then called a systems analysis approach to international relations
theory, whose chief representatives then were Morton A. Kaplan (1957) on
the deductive. theoretical. normative side, Stanley Hoffmann (1960, 1965)
on the historical-sociological side, Richard N. Rosecrance (1963) combining
hoth - all three were my teachers -- and George Modelski (1961). This is
the kind of assignment which one usually winds up having to carry out
oneself. That duly occurred, and in 1967 I found myself producing for my
students' henefit, or dismay. a manuscript called "Civilizations and World
Politics:' whose then incarnation drew on most of the aforementioned. plus
Charles McClelland (195R). A.F.K. Organski (195R. esp. chs. R. 12, and 17).
Martin Wight (1946). Raymond Aron (1966). hut most centrally the
civilizationist Carroll Quigley (1961 ). for the desired theoretical synthesis.
It didn't work.
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It didn't work because it vacillated between accepting the assumption
of the international-systems analysts that the contemporary glohe contained
one and only one system, which produced the interesting and important
phenomena of balance-of-power, states-system-and-empire, order-anddisorder, peace-and-war, and the assertion of the civilizationists that the
contemporary globe contained several distinct civilizations, defined by
common cultural forms, for which the above-mentioned phenomena were
the results of their internal processes.
Examining that manuscript at this distance in time, I am struck by the
fact that I had all that I needed to reach the resolution I in fact accomplished
much later. On the systems side, Modelski had drawn attention to
"homogeneity"' (one vs. many parallel "traditions") in a social system as an
important variable (1961: 126-30). Aron, following Papaligouras' (1941: 174)
contention that multiple parallel international legal processes had
authoritatively posited mutually contradictory international legal norms, had
argued that "the distinction between homogeneous systems and
heterogeneous systems" was fundamental (Aron, 1966:99-100), and had
defined as "heterogeneous" those international systems in which states were
organized according to different principles and obeyed different values
(1966:94,98-100, 128). Hoffmann, extending Papaligouras' argument of
(1941: Ch. VII -VIII), had argued that heterogeneous or "uneven"
international systems were also unstable or "revolutionary," because the
stakes of conflict therein were unlimited (1965:92-93). In contrast,
Rosecrance, following Ashby's cybernetics, had contended that the degree
of "variety" in international systems' disturhance and regulation was an
important empirical variable in accounting both for breakdown and for
stabilization (1963:220 ff). On the civilizationist side, Toynbec, in his
Reconsiderations, had defined "society" as the total network of relations
between human beings, "societies" as particular networks that are not
components of any larger network, "civilization" as a state of society in
which a minority of the population is liberated from economic activities,
and "civilizations" as that species of the genus society whose members are
particular historical exemplifications of the abstract idea "civilization"
(1961:271,278,280,282,287). I also had Quigley's preliminary criterion
of cities (and writing) as the external identifiers of a civilization (1961 :3132). But I tried to compromise among incompatible world-views by adopting
the criteria of all simultaneously. I proposed to examine, as civilizations and
world systems: large and coherent social areas with a large and fairly dense
population, cities, and writing; which comprised social-transactional network
structures with closed boundaries; in which wealth is created, savings
accumulated, a nonproducing class supported, and economic inventions
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created and exploited; and having unity of cultural form. These criteria
simplified empirical and comparative study famously, as nothing got past
them.
My work along these lines accordingly stagnated, though I watched
with interest the extension of Kaplan's model to a smaller scale by my thencolleague Anthony Martin (1970), the new work of Modelski (1972, 1987)
and Modelski and Thompson (1988) on the evolution of the world system,
and the beginning of what was to prove continuous development of the worldsystems approach of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), none of which, however,
could quite resolve my difficulties. Martin was examining a regional
subsystem, a core, rather than a whole system. Modelski and Thompson
brought a very useful reflection on geopolitics, and particularly the changing
meaning of naval power in systems of different sizes and hence spatial
configurations, without resolving for me the problem of the unit of analysis.
Wallerstein (like Modelski) went farther back in search of relevant history
than most systems analysts, but not as far as Quigley, whose political
economy seemed more persuasive.
After participating in the refoundation of the International Society for
the Comparative Study of Civilizations in the United States (Philadelphia,
December 1971), and in response to the dialogic initiative of Matthew Melko,
reading Melko's 1969 work The Nature of Civilizations and the manuscript
works of John Hord (q.v.), and having a 1977 redraft of "Civilizations and
World Politics" (which tried to produce a Quigleyan model, but in process
found coherence and closure to be incompatible criteria and ended by
proposing that the contemporary world constituted a single incoherent
civilization with a core-periphery structure) commented on by both, I was
impelled, in Melko's ISCSC "Boundaries" sessions of 1978-1983
(documented in Melko and Scott, eds., 1987), to a reaffirmation, a radical
simplification, a change of direction, a complete abandonment of the
coherence criterion, and new concltlsions, as follows.
1. Civilizations are world systems.
2. Their relevant criteria are cities and closed transactional networks,
not size, nor writing, nor a Quigleyan "instrument of expansion," nor cultural
coherence/homogeneity (Wilkinson, 1987b).
3. On applying these criteria to the roster of candidate civilizations, we
find that many of the "usual suspects" - Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Far
Eastern, Indie, Japanese, Peruvian, Mexican - pass muster. But many others
- Western, Islamic, Russian, Greco-Roman, Medieval - are not closed
societies; they are parts of a larger, culturally heterogeneous network-entity.
This civilization, of which these other putative "civilizations" are then
regions or epochs, needs a name. I have called it "Central" civilization
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(Wilkinson, 1987a, I 987b).
4. There was a plurality of civilizations/world systems on the globe
until the late 19th or early 20th centuries. Now there is only one survivor,
Central civilization, whose network expanded to global scale and absorbed
all others (Wilkinson, 1987a).
5. Civilizations typically show the alternation between political disunity
and political unity posited by Toynbee in his revised "Helleno-Sinic model"
(1961:157, 170-209). However, the unity - the phase of the "universal
state" (Toynbee), "universal system" (Kaplan), "world state," "universal
empire" (Quigley), or "world empire" (Wallerstein) - is usually brief and
fragile, for reasons having to do with the structure and succession of
leadership (Wilkinson, 1983, 1988).
6. The chief social bond scaled to the dimensions of the civilization is
politico-military-diplomatic. Cultural bonds have smaller scales. Until the
growth of Central civilization to global scale, economic bonds had larger
scales, and defined oikumenes, trading areas that were larger than the areas
in which states could rule, fight or ally (Wilkinson, 1992, 1993).
7. Central civilization is only the most blatantly heterogeneous of
civilizations. Other civilizations too are polycultures (Iberall and Wilkinson,
1993), though when (e.g., Japan) they have possessed a universal state of
long duration it has usually had a homogenizing ideology and utopia (cf.
Mannheim, 1936) and policy.
8. The civilization-formation process was still continuing - that is,
cities were appearing on preurban social terrain, not as extensions of or
reactions to the political impingements of neighboring cities, hut often as
reactions to the economic impingements of oikumenes - perhaps as late as
the 17th, even the 18th century in Africa (Wilkinson, 1993, 19(4).
9. Central civilization formed in the first instance in the mid-2nd
millennium BC, in consequence of the expansion, collision and fusion of
two pre-existing civilizations, Mesopotamian and Egyptian. It grew by
expanding against, and engulfing, other civilizations, without ever fully
homogenizing them or itself (Wilkinson, 1984).
10. The heterogeneities of other civilizations may be the result of the
same processes. That is, a trade network extends itself into a preurban social
terrain; a city forms, perhaps so that a local political elite can avail itself of
the local surplus thereby generated; but a larger expanding civilization, its
familiars driven by similar motives, in due course recruits the new city to
its polity. The motives to recruit it to its (anyway heterogeneous) culture are
weaker, and a diversity of languages (and dialects), religions (and cults and
schisms), races (and physiognomies and ethnicities and families), apparels,
etc. persists. Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Indic, Far Eastern, Mcxican, and
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Peruvian civilization could fruitfully be examined comparatively, with a
view to relating their various heterogeneities to the order and independence
of their urbanization processes.
This summary leads naturally to the main topic ofthis paper: the current
debate in our overlapping fields, and the positions of the participants. I shall
try to locate myself with respect to each of a large number of participants.
Toynbec. I draw very heavily on Toynbee, both in agreement and in
opposition, but almost exclusively on his extensively revised model of 1961,
from Reconsiderations, rather than on the much better-known earlier volumes
of A Study of History. My definition of a civilization/world system takes
off from his rethinking (1961 :278-87). My roster is based on a critique of
his list and Quigley's. In an empirical test of his civilizational kinematics
(phase transition sequence), original and revised versions, vs. those of
Spengler, Philip Bagby (1958), Melko, and Quigley, my data fit the
expectations of his revised theory perfectly; those of his original theory came
in next best (Wilkinson, 1986:29). Toynbee is however seduced by the
mythos of cultural coherence - not entirely, no one is, and he provides a
useful model of cultural contradiction and connict, but he relates it integrally
to breakdown. He is replete with fertile notions, and, I believe, is the most
liberal of civilizationists, in the oldest sense ofthat word; an excellent teacher.
Quigley. Carroll Quigley provides a single, powerful, illuminating
insight into the dynamics of civilizations, the concept of the instrument of
expansion, which I view as a nonpartisan and nonsupersessionist
empiricization of the Marxian "mode of production," and as such an
improvement, with extensive research and practical implications. Some hint
of the latter can be found, on suitable occasions, in the kaleidoscopic
consciousness of Quigley's one-time student, William Jefferson Clinton.
Where many if not most civilizationists have centrally focused on culture,
Quigley focuses centrally on economics, and will probably be easiest for the
world-systems tradition to come to grips with. However, after spending some
time tryi ng to validate his proposition that growing civilizations are pervaded
by a single instrument of expansion, I judged that I had disconfirmed it
instead, gave up expecting macrosocieties to display much institutional
coherence, and began to consider the structure of their incoherence. In that
incoherence, I think that many of Quigley's propositions will be partially
confirmed, and that the location and limits of their application will be
significant.
Spengler. Spengler is the Antaeus of civilizationists, brilliantly,
perversely, powerfully wrong in more ways than any two others combined.
Spengler's kcy proposition, to the effect that each civilization develops a
single prime symbol, an all-pervasive style, is especially brilliantly wrong
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(the Gramscian doctrine of cultural "hegemony" being less so, except insofar
as it is doctrinaire, an answer instead of a question), and should point us to
the study ofthe failure of repeated attempts in that direction, and the resilience
of deviant, oppositional, variant, heretical, inverted, oppressed symbols, as
thematic of polycultural history. Is this failure correlated with the failure to
develop a single prime mode of production, class struggle, durable world
state and cosmopolis? I suspect so.
Melko. Melko accepts that today many civilizations coexist, and objects
to the idea that the only way we can study contemporary civilization
comparatively is to do so by reference to history. That is indeed the logical
consequence of my acceptance that today only one civilization exists. Our
respective rosters are properly derived from different definitions; we can
agree on some phenomena common to the civilizations that appear on both
our rosters. However, while he, like Spengler (1926: Table III), sees a feudal
state-imperial polity sequence (1969:101-32), I perceive no
holocivilizational feudal phase. Feudalism does indeed appear in
semiperipheries, with regard to which I find Rushton Coulborn's arguments
(1956:364-66) about feudalism as "a mode of revival of a society whose
polity has gone into extreme disintegration" in marginal regions - religion
being the general and core-area recovery modality - quite convincing. As
for states systems and empires, I find not a supersession but an alternation,
following Toynbee's Helleno-Sinic model, in which, consistent with Robert
Wesson's work (1967,1978), the states-system phase is more robust.
Melko is also doubtful, as is Chase-Dunn, about my admission to
civilizational status of very small-scale societies, with only one or two cities
- Melko questions my "Chibchan" civilization, Chase-Dunn my "Irish."
More recently - since I have responded only by accepting even smaller
civilizations into my roster (Wilkinson, 1993, 1994), Melko has suggested
that I will have to locate still others, for example, in Central Asia. My point
(10) above concurs with him. I hadn't closed my roster of civilizations in
1982 or 1987 (Wilkinson, 1980-1982, 1987b), and I am not ready to close
it now. Current candidates not treated then include several African
possibilities, and a second (!) Colombian candidate, Tairona "civilization."
Hord. I view all of John Hord's papers (q.v.) with great interest. Our
definitions of "civilization" are irreducibly different, but I believe that the
relatively homogeneous political-cultural entities he studies under that label
are genuine, and his understanding of them creative and novel. The
persistence and the fissility of his constitutional traditions has helped to
persuade me that (my) civilizations are characteristically, not just
incidentally, polycultures.
Sorokin. I have discussed Sorokin more fully elsewhere (forthcoming,
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1995). In brief: I concur with Sorokin's powerful critique (1950:113-20,
206-17; 1956: 163-64; 1963:413-19; 1966: 121-22,548-49) of civilizationists
- Spengler, Nikolai Danilevsky (1920), and especially Toynbee - who
observed social groups and thought they observed cultural groups. Sorokin
however resolves the difficulty by refusing the analytic concept of
"civilization." I resolve it by treating civilizations as social groups and not
as cultural groups, each, just as Sorokin complained (1950:213), "a cultural
field where a multitude of vast and small cultural systems and congeries partly mutually harmonious, partly neutral, partly contradictory - coexist."
Huntington. Sorokin's comment is worth recalling in another context.
Samuel P. Huntington has lately (1993) brought a political scientist's
perspective to the study of civilizations. He defines civilizations as cultural
groupings and cultural identities, accepts the plurality of contemporary
civilizations, presents a largely Toynbeean civilizational roster (23-25), and
hypothesizes that in the next phase of world politics "the fault lines between
civilizations will be the battIe lines of the future" (22). His argument is
detailed and provocative. I believe Sorokin would rightly contend that
Huntington's "major civilizations"-"Western, Confucian, Japanese,
Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African
civilization" (25) - are "cultural fields" rather than either systems or
potential actors. I would add that they are cultural subfields in the global
cultural field of a single civilization, a social and not a cultural entity. I
consequently doubt the hypotheses that "conflict between civilizations will
supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form
of conflict" and that "international relations ... will increasingly ... become a
game in which non-Western civilizations are actors ... " (48). More likely,
nostalgic ideologies of lost civilizational isolation and cultural status will
be used to mobilize support for struggles for power and prestige within a
solitary, incoherent civilization in which the ideologues have neither the
capacity nor the intention to creat~ a coherent cultural system, let alone a
culture capable of functioning as an actor.
Melko has objected to my schema (which describes the general course
of macrosocial history as the fusion of many small civilizations into the one
contemporary global civilization) on the grounds that it destroys the
possibility of a comparative study of civilizations, except so far as that study
is also historical. That is indeed its logical consequence. But those who
nonetheless wish to examine dialogically Huntington's contention that the
next stage in global political conflict will be a conflict of civilizations can
still do so perfectly well, but employing the different (and to my mind more
precise) locution "conflict of cultures within a single civilization." We can
then proceed to use for our historical analogs not the past collisions and
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fusions between civilizations, but the more frequent, more complex and
delicate (and, I suspect, more dialogic and perhaps even less violent) interplay
of the parts of a single society's polyculture. As a first approximation, on
account of the analogy I consider appropriate I am probably a bit more
sanguine about the outcome of such a conflict, even while being less sure
of its coming rise to prominence, than Huntington.
Chase-Dunn and Hall vs. Frank and Gills. On the issue of whether there
are many different precapitalist world-systems with different modes of
production (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 199Ia:23), or a single SOOO-year worldsystem with a single developmental logic (Frank and Gills), I partly split the
difference and partly disagree with both. (I) I don't use the term
"precapitalist" to describe any empirical civilization/world system; while
capitalist (and socialist) ideals, ideologies, and utopias are rather recent, their
accumulative and distributive practices are very old, possibly both
contemporaneous with the startup of civilization. (2) I find many different
world-systems (like Chase-Dunn and Hall), but of such unequal size, duration
and terminus that one ofthem (essentially that focused on by Gills and Frank)
eventually engulfed the others; this is the political!civilizational structure I
call Central Civilization. (3) In consequence of not finding one pervasive
Quigleyan "instrument of expansion" in any civilization, I don't use the term
"mode of production" in any world-system-Icvel application, except as a
hypothesis I don't expect to see confirmed. Each of the civilizations is
heterogeneous, polycultural, incoherent with respect to its politico-economic
patterning; though at some times in each some new or reinvented form has
looked like it would spread throughout and extirpate all others, it is
"institutionalized" (in the Quigleyan sense, i.e., detlectcd and corrupted) and
reaches a limit well short of that. This pattern of failure is as interesting as
the variety of forms and their mutual displacement processes, and should
keep a generation or so of macrosocial theorists productively employed in
verifying, describing, and explaining it.
This said, I find the projects of these four researchers intriguing and
productive, and extremely worthwhile discussing. I suspect that all of these
researchers are more sanguine than I am about the possibility of reducing
political to economic phenomena. This vision is appealing because it suggests
there may be economic (non-zero-sum) solutions to political (and apparently
zero-sum) problems. Without necessarily rejecting the vision, I would treat
economies and polities as different though always linked. Critical evidence
that this is an empirical, and confirmable, proposition is the difference in
historical scale between the political-diplomatic constellations of
civilizations and the trade-networks of oikumenes/world-economies until
the 19th century. A critical case for future discussion is the relationship
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between Rome and China, in which China, politico-diplomatically and
militarily inaccessible to Rome (and not part of the same civilization/world
system), seems inadvertently to have inflicted severe economic damage on
it (currency drain, implying location in the same world-economy/oikumene).
This proposition is related to, and strengthened by, F.J. Teggart's contention
(1939:239-41) that Chinese statesmen who consciously chose to make wars
on their western frontiers caused, without intending or knowing it, invasions
of Rome's eastern frontiers, "conflicts and devastations in regions of which
they had never heard," by disrupting silk route (and fur) trade. Rome and
China in this period present the classic case of states belonging to the same
world-economy. or oikumene, and different civilizations, different worldpolities, and - in my meaning - different world systems.
Chase-Dunn. Since the 1970s I have held that all civilizations are world
systems; but since the 1960s I have accepted that there are some world
systems which are not civilizations, that is, very small, nonurban
polycultures. Christopher Chase-Dunn is now in the lead on this line of
research, which should help to detail the differences between the smallest,
city less, world systems and the next level larger, the one- and two-city
protocivilizations, of which I now believe several, probably many, more
must have existed (most only briefly, "abortive" in a sense analogous to
Toynbee' s) than have as yet been found. One appropriate line of comparativecivilizational fieldwork for the future will, with luck, be the search for lost
and forgotten cities, carried on with new and superior technical means
afforded by aerial and satellite photography, with searches for patterned,
centric, and radial disturbances of soil and vegetation, showing the patterns
of points and lines that usually represent civilizational geometry. The first
fruitful zone for such exploration will I think be the forested areas of Africa
south of the Sahara.
On another issue (not yet discussed in print), Chase-Dunn is
considerably more skeptical, and I considerably more receptive, to the socialphysics or complex-systems-physics ideas of Arthur S. Iberall, which I have
found productive of useful hypotheses (as to, for example, why and how the
several early-born civilizations initially formed near simultaneously (lberall
and Wilkinson, 1986); the relation of polyculturality to civilization (Iberall
and Wilkinson, 1993); what might be the order of magnitude of the number
of cities and civilizations "missing" from current records and to be searched
for (Wilkinson, 1994, forthcoming).
Gills and Frank. Currently the best short compilation of their
contentions, examined at length in Frank and Gills (1993), is Frank's five
propositions (1993:2). (I) The "existence and development of the present
world system stretches back at least 5000 years": I date its existence back
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3500 years, when there was a critical fusion of its predecessors or roots,
which go back at least 5500 years; in essence we concur. (2) The "same
process of capital accumulation has played a, if not the, central role in the
world system for several millennia": I say "a, but not the" central role, in
this and all other civilizational world systems (but not in the nonurban world
systems Chase-Dunn studies). (3) The "Center-Periphery Slructure .. .is also
applicable to the world system before 1492": having accepted Quigley's
(1961) argument on this point when he made it, I more than agree; the
structure is applicable to all civilizations, that is, to all civiJizational world
systems (but not necessarily to nonurban world systems); I have provided a
more detailed account (Wilkinson, 1991). (4) Hegemony "and rivalry for
the same a!so mark world system history long before" 1492: I agree as to
rivalry, extending my agreement to the other world systems; but there is a
lot less hegemony achieved than is believed, and most of the best-known
"hegemons" (e.g., 19th-century Britain, the United States after World War
II) simply aren't. (5) The "world system cycle" of A phases and B phases
extends back many centuries before 1492: I agree fully, and have confirmed
this independently (Wilkinson, 1992, 1993), for other world systems as weIl.
Aside from differences over the centrality of economics and the
frequency and nature of hegemony still to be resolved, I see another topic
for argument - within basic agreement - over the balance between statist
and marketive capital accumulation. There may be periods in which states
are the main engines of accumulation, and other periods in which private
families are; more likely there are areas in each period where one or the
other form dominates. But I suspect the prevailing pattern and persistent
substratum is the cheek-by-jowl coexistence of very different forms even at
the very local spatial scale, with a process change at the house threshold, at
the market gate, at the cultic center (see my argument about the classical
Athenian economy [I 987a]).
I conclude as I began. The best way to deal with the discussions between
civilizationists and world-systems analysts is to aver that the entities we are
studying largely are, and ought to be, the same. Our theories ought to be
merged. Having attempted to develop such a merger since encountering the
civilizationist literature in the 1950s and the international-systems literature
in the early 1960s, I can only view the current interaction with great pleasure.
University of California, Los Angeles
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